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Contract design with countervailing incentives, correlated
information and limited liability
1 Introduction
In some agency problems, the agent displays countervailing incentives, i.e. the temp-
tation either to overstate or to understate his private information (the type) in the report
to the principal, depending upon its specic realization. For instance, Lewis and Sapping-
ton [6] show that countervailing incentives arise in regulator-rm hierarchies when the
rm/agents production technology is such that the xed cost depends negatively on the
marginal cost, which is unknown to the regulator/principal. As Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare [8] point out, this is a plausible case because, in regulated sectors, low marginal
costs are likely associated with high overhead costs.
The literature on contract design in the presence of countervailing incentives has ne-
glected the possibility that some additional piece of information, correlated with the
agents type, become publicly available after the contract is drawn up. This approach
appears to be restrictive with regards to various real-world contexts in which counter-
vailing incentives may arise. For instance, a national regulator dealing with some local
monopoly (say, a public utility) under ex ante asymmetric information is generally able to
acquire some more knowledge over time, say, by observing the performance of regulated
monopolies in neighboring countries, who share stochastically some information with the
home country monopoly. This can a¤ect the contractual strategies at hand and, hence,
the achievements of the national regulator.
In this article, we characterize the optimal contract between a principal and an agent
who may have countervailing incentives, focusing on situations where the agents type is
correlated with some external signal that is observed after the contract has been signed
and the agent has chosen his production for the principal. To make the analysis truly
realistic, we consider the case in which the agent is limitedly liable, that is also typical of
regulatory settings, for instance. We thus extend the research work about countervailing
incentives to correlated information settings with limited liability on the agents side1.
From the literature we learn that information correlation enables the principal to
retain surplus from the agent (Crémer and McLean [2], Riordan and Sappington [9]).
However, limited liability can reduce the benets from correlation and make rent extraction
more di¢ cult (Demougin and Garvie [3], Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4]). The literature
further shows that the presence of countervailing incentives tends to relax informational
constraints (Lewis and Sappington [6], Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [8] etc.). This suggests
1 In certain environments, the perspective of new correlated information appearing at later stage may
induce the principal to delay contracting. However, this possibility may not apply to the settings we have
in mind mainly. For instance, regulators may not be in a position to delay contracting with regulated rms
that provide services of general interest. Anyway, it would be beyond the scope of the present paper to
tackle issues related to strategic waiting.
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that also countervailing incentives may help the principal in the relationship with the
agent. That is, they may operate in the same direction as correlation. One may thus
wonder how the principal can still exploit correlation and what she can achieve in so doing
in environments where the agent displays countervailing incentives but is protected by
limited liability. Besides, from the literature we know that, under some circumstances,
countervailing incentives induce pooling in the optimal contract (Lewis and Sappington [6],
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [8] etc.). Therefore, another open question is how information
correlation (which is benecial to the principal) and limited liability (which is detrimental)
a¤ect the screening ability of the principal in the presence of countervailing incentives. Our
study is meant to address these issues.
At this aim, we construct a model that brings together countervailing incentives, infor-
mation correlation and limited liability as core ingredients. In the model, countervailing
incentives may arise because the agents production technology is taken to include a xed
cost that declines with the privately known marginal cost (the type), a representation
inspired to that of Lewis and Sappington [6]2. Besides, the agents type is known to be
correlated with a random signal observable ex post, a feature that has only appeared in
standard models with systematic incentives to misrepresent type so far (Riordan and Sap-
pington [9], Demougin and Garvie [3], Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4])3. Finally, the agent can
only sustain bounded nancial losses ex post, in the same vein as in Demougin and Garvie
[3] and Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4], among others.
To begin with, our analysis evidences how the incentive scheme that yields theM inimum
Feasible Loss to the agent (the MFL scheme), and is thus most likely to implement the
rst-best outcome under limited liability, is specically a¤ected by the existence of coun-
tervailing incentives. In a setting with systematic incentives to overstate type, Gary-Bobo
and Spiegel [4] show that, under a scheme of this kind, all agents types are rewarded if
some critical signal is observed and incur an equal decit whenever it is not, the critical
signal being chosen such that the decit is minimized. A similar result is obtained in a
framework where countervailing incentives may arise, with the di¤erence that the signal
is no longer the same for all possible types. To understand this di¤erence, one can inter-
pret the nding of Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4] as follows. As long as the agent exhibits
systematic incentives to overstate type, the principal picks the signal that is most likely to
2The modelling device we use for the technology, which ts particularly well the regulatory settings
mentioned in the text, is actually exible enough to sketch circumstances other than technological features
stricto sensu. As Lewis and Sappington [6] evidence, it further captures the possibility that valuable
managerial skills be associated with protable outside options. Countervailing incentives also appear when
the agents reservation utility is decreasing with his productivity in the activity performed for the principal
(compare, for instance, Lewis and Sappington [7], Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [8], Brainard and Martimort
[1]; Jullien [5]). As an application, Lewis and Sappington [7] describe the relationship between a landowner
who endows her farmer with some capital grant at the outset of their agreement, which limits the farmers
incentive to exaggerate production costs. Jullien [5] provides further applications concerning linear and
nonlinear pricing. These are all situations in which it is very likely that the principal can exploit some
external piece of information correlated with the agents type.
3Actually, in our model, new information is conveyed by a purely informational signal as in Riordan and
Sappington [9] and Demougin and Garvie [3]. In Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4], the agents type is correlated
with a signal that is, in fact, a shock a¤ecting the agents cost itself.
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be drawn by higher types. Indeed, for some given type, the probability of reward is lower
the higher the likelihood of reward for higher types. Thus, a lower loss su¢ ces to remove
that types incentives to over-report. The more likely the type is to incur a decit, the
smaller the decit the principal needs to impose to prevent mimicking. In a framework
with countervailing incentives, the result of Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4] carries over for a
low-marginal-cost agent, who has an incentive to over-report, but it needs to be amended
for a high-marginal-cost agent, who has an incentive to under-report. Actually, for the
latter, minimizing the decit requires that the reward be assigned when the signal that is
most likely to be drawn by lower types is observed. Overall, in the presence of counter-
vailing incentives, whether the agent is rewarded or bears a loss depends not only on the
signal realization but also on his type realization.
Beside characterizing the MFL scheme in our framework, we identify a su¢ cient con-
dition on the agents cost function for it to implement rst best. We nd that the MFL
contract entails full e¢ ciency if the cost function (or, more precisely, the xed cost) is
non-concave in type, provided the conditional likelihood function of the signal is concave
in the agents type. This means that, as far as FB is to be e¤ected by the MFL scheme,
not only the presence of countervailing incentives adds requirements in terms of relevant
signals, it also tightens the condition on costs. This can be seen by comparing our nding
with those of Riordan and Sappington [9]. In a model similar to that of Gary-Bobo and
Spiegel [4] but without limited liability concerns, these authors assess that one simple way
to implement rst best is to use the same payo¤ scheme as in Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4],
except that the relevant signal is not necessarily chosen to minimize the loss. They show
that such a scheme does e¤ect rst best if the agents cost function is less concave in type
than so is the conditional likelihood function of the relevant signal, a condition that is
surely satised in the model of Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4] where the agents cost function
is taken to be strictly convex. Our result di¤ers from that of Riordan and Sappington [9]
for the following reason. In a setting where countervailing incentives arise, there exists
some intermediary type that displays no incentive to cheat because it produces at highest
total costs. From the principals perspective, this is the least e¢ cient type. Under the
MFL contract, this type is assigned a payo¤ equal to zero, whatever the signal. That is,
information correlation plays no role in the payo¤ prole designed for the least e¢ cient
type. Because of this, the principal would be unable to extract surplus from other types
that were to mimic this particular type. It turns out that, with a concave cost function,
the MFL scheme leaves all other types with an incentive to actually mimic this particular
type.
The next contribution of our research rests on the observation that, under the MFL
contract, rst best can only arise when the penalty it yields is smaller than the maximum
sustainable decit for all types (or, at the limit, it equals that decit for some types),
but this penalty results independently of the agents actual liability. Because of this, the
principal takes less advantage of type correlation than she would if any larger sustainable
decit were assigned to the agent. This aspect is especially relevant in environments
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with countervailing incentives. Indeed, in the latter, intermediary types are assigned
particularly low losses and this contractual o¤er may become attractive for other types.
To circumvent this di¢ culty, we propose an alternative scheme under which the minimum
feasible decit is replaced with the M aximum Sustainable Loss (from which MSL scheme)
for all types, including the one that produces at highest total costs. We show that the
MSL scheme is the best possible contractual option for the principal as it allows to exploit
type correlation at maximum, given the agents liability. The benet is that rst best is
e¤ected under milder conditions. While under the MFL contract rst best arises if the
cost function is non-concave in type, under the MSL scheme it arises if the cost function
is "not excessively" concave, a condition that is relaxed the more liable the agent is.
When the minimum feasible loss exceeds the maximum decit the agent can sustain,
rst best cannot be implemented (at least for some types). Our subsequent contribution
is to characterize the optimal second-best contract for this case. We nd that, once again,
the contractual features heavily depend both on the nature of the agents incentives and on
the cost characteristics that determine their intensity. Two relevant situations can arise,
depending on the curvature of the cost function with respect to type.
If the cost function is less concave in type than some relevant threshold (the rst possi-
ble situation), then there exist some types for which rst best is still e¤ected. This outcome
follows from the possibility to exploit type correlation by inicting (bounded) losses in the
presence of countervailing incentives. It does not appear in correlated information en-
vironments with systematic incentives to over-report, as represented by Gary-Bobo and
Spiegel [4], in which tight limited liability prevents rst-best implementation for any type.
In our model, rst best survives for a continuum range of intermediate types neighboring
the least e¢ cient one. This is explained by considering that, because such types display
weak incentives to cheat, as they are turned between the desire to over-report and that to
under-report, the principal does not need to assign large losses (and rewards) to induce
them to truthtell. Therefore, as far as intermediate types are concerned, the limits on lia-
bility remain irrelevant in the contractual design. The rst-best outcome is beyond reach
for all remaining types, instead. Moving away from the intermediate types, lower and
higher types exhibit increasingly stronger incentives to over and under-report respectively.
This involves that, for the types immediately below and above the intermediate ones, the
quantity is distorted just enough to retain all surplus and, at the same time, to solicit
information release and satisfy the limits on liability. On the other hand, an information
rent is conceded to very low and very high types. As usual, this rent is contained by
distorting the quantity till the ensuing loss exactly compensates the surplus extraction
gain (the familiar e¢ ciency/rent-extraction trade-o¤). The second-best contract in our
framework compares with that in Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4] with sole regards to this last
case. More precisely, the similarity concerns the contract designed for low types with
intense incentives to over-report. This is so because the countervailing e¤ect is weak for
such types, so that the principal faces a (nearly) standard adverse selection problem.
If the cost function is more concave in type than the relevant threshold aforementioned
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(the second possible situation), then also this cost characteristics, and not only the limits
on liability, has an impact on contractual performance. The incentive problem is exacer-
bated to the point that information is not released unless the principal induces pooling in
the contract, i.e. an inexible rule for some given bunch of types. Under this rule, the
quantity that is e¢ cient for the type that has no incentive to cheat (the least e¢ cient type)
is assigned to all types in its neighborhood. As that type is also the sole from which all
surplus is retained ex ante, it is the sole for which the rst-best outcome is still enforced.
Comparing with Lewis and Sappington [6] - [7], it emerges that this incentive scheme is
similar in structure to the contract that is optimal in uncorrelated information settings
with countervailing incentives when the xed cost is concave in type.
Further comparing the whole bulk of our results with those obtained in uncorrelated
information contexts, we are able to shed light on how the presence of correlation and
liability a¤ects the "knife-edge" situation between pooling and separating equilibria. This
is the last contribution of our study. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [8] show that, in uncor-
related information settings, the knife-edge situation is represented by the case of linear
xed cost (linear reservation utility, in their model), in which the optimal contract entails
pooling and no rent for a range of intermediate types. Pooling is removed as soon as the
xed cost becomes convex. It persists with all types but one getting a rent as soon as the
xed cost becomes concave. According to our results, in correlated information environ-
ments, the linear case would still be the knife-edge situation if the agent were unable to
sustain any decit ex post. With the agent (limitedly) liable, it is rather given by the con-
cavity threshold we mentioned to distinguish the two situations that can be realized with
tight limited liability. Importantly, we nd that this threshold relaxes as the maximum
loss the agent can bear raises. We thus conclude that the possibility to take advantage of
correlation by inicting penalties to the agent removes pooling in a class of situations in
which it would otherwise arise, i.e. in contexts where technologies are such that the xed
cost is concave but not too concave in type, and that this class enlarges as the agents
pocket becomes deeper.
The reminder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model.
Section 3 focuses on implementation of the rst-best outcome. In section 4, we char-
acterize the optimal contract for the case of tight limited liability. Section 5 concludes.
Mathematical details are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
A risk-neutral principal P contracts with a risk-neutral agent for the production of q
units of some good. Production costs are given by
C (q; c) = cq +K (c) ; (1)
where c is the marginal cost and K (c) the xed cost. Similarly to Lewis and Sappington
[6], we take the xed cost to decrease with the marginal cost (K 0 (c) < 0): However, unlike
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these authors who suppose concavity, we make no assumption about the curvature of
K () :
At the contracting stage, the agent is privately informed about c (the type). It is
commonly known that c is drawn from the continuous support [c; c] with density function
f (c) and cumulative distribution function F (c) : Moreover, the marginal cost is correlated
with a random signal s that is drawn from the discrete support N  f1; :::; ng and is
publicly observable ex post. We denote p (c; s) = Pr ob(s jc) the probability of observing
the signal s conditional on type c: The larger the value of s; the more likely c is to be large
in turn. We take p (c; s) to be di¤erentiable everywhere with respect to c:
2.1 The principals programme
As usual, the Revelation Principle applies and attention can be restricted to direct
revelation mechanisms in which the agent reports his true type. A mechanism designed
for an agent of type c and some signal s is an allocation fq (c) ; t (c; s)g ; with q (c) the
quantity to be produced and t (c; s) the transfer to be paid. Under truthful reporting, the
agents ex post and interim prot are respectively given by
 (c; s) = t (c; s)  [cq (c) +K (c)] (2a)
Es [ (c; s)] 
nX
s=1
ft (c; s)  [cq (c) +K (c)]g p (c; s) : (2b)
Truthful reporting in a Bayesian setting is induced by satisfying the following incentive
constraints
Es [ (c; s)] 
nX
s=1
ft (r; s)  [cq (r) +K (c)]g p (c; s) ; 8c 2 [c; c] : (IC)
Besides, P needs to satisfy the participation constraints
Es [ (c; s)]  0; 8c 2 [c; c] ; (PC)
and the limited liability constraints
 (c; s)   L; 8c 2 [c; c] ; 8s 2 N; (LL)
for some given L  0:
Let S (q (c)) the gross utility P obtains when q (c) units of the good are provided, with
S (0) = 0; S0 > 0; S00 < 0; S0 (0) = +1 and S0 (+1) = 0: Ps objective is to achieve the
highest attainable level of utility. The latter is taken to be a weighed sum of gross utility
net of transfer, namely V (q (c)) = S (q (c))  t (c; s), and the agents prot. Formally, Ps
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programme is written:
Max
fq(c);(c;s)g
fW  Z c
c
nX
s=1
[V (q (c)) +  (c; s)] p (c; s) f (c) dc
subject to ( )
(IC), (PC) and (LL),
with  2 [0; 1]4:
3 First-best implementation
The rst-best outcome (FB hereafter) entails whenever P can design transfers tfb (c; s)
for the production of qfb (c) units of the good, such that S0(qfb (c)) = c; and retain all
surplus ex ante from the agent, i.e. Es[fb (c; s)] = 0: In this section, we explore in which
ways and under which conditions this is feasible, indeed.
To make (LL) most likely satised, a natural strategy for P is to o¤er the mechanism
that minimizes the loss to be assigned to the agent for all possible types. Gary-Bobo and
Spiegel [4] present this strategy in a framework in which the agent has a systematic incen-
tive to over-report type. We hereafter adopt the same method to show how the mechanism
that yields the minimum feasible loss is to be designed in the presence of countervailing
incentives. We highlight that, in the context we consider, such a mechanism fails to be
incentive compatible for a wide class of technologies. To circumvent this di¢ culty, we sub-
sequently characterize an alternative incentive scheme that implements FB under milder
conditions.
3.1 The Minimum-feasible-loss scheme
Before moving to the analysis, we observe that, under FB implementation, (IC) is
conveniently replaced by the pair of conditions
qfb (c) +K 0 (c) +
nX
s=1
fb (c; s)
dp (c; s)
dc
= 0 (LIC)
nX
s=1
n
tfb (r; s)  cqfb (r) K (c)
o
p (c; s)  0; (GIC)
where tfb (r; s) is the FB transfer that P makes to the agent when the latter reports r
and s is observed. (LIC) requires that the agent has no incentive to report r 6= c in
a neighborhood of his true type c (local incentive compatibility)5. (GIC) ensures that
4As standard in the literature, in a regulation context, transfers to agents (the regulated rms) can be
thought of as made out of the public budget if products are public goods. In the case of private goods, S ()
can be interpreted as the gross consumer surplus for each product (i.e. the integral of the inverse demand
function) and transfers to agents as including both the usage fees and the xed fees paid by consumers
(or, as an alternative to the latter, a subsidy made out of the public budget). In a procurement context,
a natural choice would be to set  = 0:
5 (LIC) is obtained from standard calculations, that are reported in Appendix A.1.
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the agent has no interest in reporting any r 6= c within the feasible set (global incentive
compatibility).
Consider now the reduced programme in which (LL) and (GIC) are neglected. It is
dened as follows:
Max
fq(c);(c;s)g
fW ( 0)
s:t: (LIC) and (PC) :
Let any solution to ( 0) the vector of prots fb (c)  fb (c; 1) ; :::; fb (c; n)	 and
the quantity qfb (c) for each given c: As there are more combinations of prots fb (c; s)
that solve ( 0) for each given c; dene 
 the set of all vectors fb (c) : Furthermore, dene
 the set that contains the lowest element of each vector fb (c) : Finally, let  (c) the
largest element of : This is the minimum feasible loss under which FB is implemented
for any given c: Once  (c) is identied, it is possible to identify also the specic set of
prots, among all those in 
; to which it belongs. Denote such a set  (c). This is the
set of FB prots under which (LL) is least likely to be binding in the original programme
( ) : From now on, we refer to the incentive scheme that implements FB with prots in
 (c) as to the "Minimum-feasible-loss" (MFL) scheme.
Lemma 1 (Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4]) Under the MFL scheme, for any c 2 [c; c] ; the
agent is rewarded whenever s takes some value s = es (c) and bears the smallest feasible
loss whenever s 6= es (c) ; the loss being equal in size for all s 6= es (c).
By this lemma, under the MFL scheme, the set  (c) reduces to only two values for
each type c: As Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4] explain, spreading punishments over as many
realizations of s as possible (i.e., all feasible realizations but one) allows P to minimize
the highest possible loss for each type of agent. This requires that the largest reward-loss
wedge that can be realized over all possible realizations of s be minimized.
Based on Lemma 1, for all c 2 [c; c] ; the MFL pair of prots is found to be
fb (c; s)

s=es(c) =
h
qfb (c) +K 0 (c)
i 1  p (c; es (c))
dp (c; es (c)) =dc  fb (c; es (c)) (3)
fb (c; s)

s 6=es(c) =
h
qfb (c) +K 0 (c)
i  p (c; es (c))
dp (c; es (c)) =dc  fb (c; es (c)) ; (4)
the di¤erence

fb (c; es (c))  fb (c; es (c)) being the lowest feasible wedge when FB is
implemented under (LIC) and (PC).
It is interesting to illustrate how es (c) should be selected in our framework, in which
the agent does not exhibit a systematic incentive to misrepresent type. The choice of es (c)
depends on the sign of the sum qfb (c)+K 0 (c) ; which may not be the same for all c 2 [c; c]
as K 0 (c) < 0: When this sum is positive, the situation is similar to that Gary-Bobo and
Spiegel [4] consider (i.e. K 0 (c) = 0) and the same result obtains. For (4) to be a loss
(fb (c; es (c)) < 0), es (c) must be such that the probability of its realization raises with c;
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i.e. dp (c; es (c)) =dc > 0: Moreover, for (4) to be the smallest feasible loss, r (c) must be
such that the ratio p(c;es(c))dp(c;es(c))=dc is minimized. This is tantamount to requiring that the ratio
dp(c;es(c))=dc
p(c;es(c)) be maximized. One can interpret this result (and hence that of Gary-Bobo and
Spiegel [4]) by observing that dp(c;es(c))=dcp(c;es(c)) is the rate of increase of the conditional likelihood
that signal es (c) be drawn as c increases. This means that, for any given c; es (c) is to be the
signal for which higher types are most likely to be drawn. Intuitively, because any type c
that has an incentive to over-report is more likely to incur a decit than higher types are, a
smaller decit su¢ ces to remove that types incentive to mimic. Similar reasoning applies,
mutatis mutandis, when qfb (c) + K 0 (c) < 0: In that case, es (c) must be such that its
conditional likelihood decreases with c; i.e. dp (c; es (c)) =dc < 0; and the ratio dp(c;es(c))=dcp(c;es(c))
is minimized. That is, for any given c; the agent is to be rewarded when the signal that is
most likely to be drawn by lower possible types does materialize. By doing so, a smaller
decit can be imposed to remove incentives to under-report. The sole situation in which
the value of es (c) is irrelevant arises when qfb (c) +K 0 (c) = 0; in which case both (3) and
(4) reduce to zero.
To identify the signal es (c) for each feasible c it is useful to make the following assump-
tions.
Assumption 1 K 00 (c) <  dqfb(c)dc ; 8c 2 [c; c] :
Assumption 2 The conditional likelihood function is such that:
dp (c; n)
dc
> 0 and
d2p (c; n)
dc2
< 0; 8c 2 [c; c] (5)
dp (c; 1)
dc
< 0 and
d2p (c; 1)
dc2
< 0; 8c 2 [c; c] : (6)
Assumption 3 The conditional likelihood function satises the following properties:
d
dc

p (c; s)
p (c; n)

 0; 8c 2 [c; c] ; 8s 2 N (7)
d
dc

p (c; s)
p (c; 1)

 0; 8c 2 [c; c] ; 8s 2 N: (8)
Assumption 1 is equivalent to saying that the sum qfb (c) + K 0 (c) decreases with c;
so that it is positive for low types and possibly negative for high types. Negative values
appear if and only if there exists some bc 2 [c; c] at which qfb (c)+K 0 (c) = 0: (5) (resp. (6))
in Assumption 2 tells that the probability of drawing es (c) = n (resp. es (c) = 1) increases
(resp. decreases) with type c at a decreasing rate. Assumption 2 is thus a requirement
on the behaviour of p (c; s) at two values of s; which we take to be n and 1: (7) (resp.
(8)) in Assumption 3 requires that the rate of increase (resp. decrease) of the conditional
likelihood that s = n (resp. s = 1) be drawn is higher (resp. lower) than that of any other
signal.
An assumption similar to (5) is found in both Riordan and Sappington [9] and Gary-
Bobo and Spiegel [4]. The former explore a single-agent framework in which the agents
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types are correlated with an ex post observable signal, the space of which is smaller than
that of the possible types. With regard to this framework, they show that P can implement
FB using information about a unique signal, provided the conditional likelihood function
has analogous features to those described in (5) at that sole signal. Additionally, Gary-
Bobo and Spiegel [4] identify the relevant signal (a shock a¤ecting the cost, in their case)
to be the highest feasible one and make an assumption analogous to (7) to warrant that
this is indeed the state in which the agent should be rewarded for the loss to be minimized.
Unlike in Riordan and Sappington [9] and Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4], in our environment
with countervailing incentives, it is necessary to refer to two signals, which explains the
introduction of (6) and (8) on top of (5) and (7).
Our previous assumptions allow us to determine the values of es (c) in (3) and (4), as
stated in the lemma hereafter.
Lemma 2 Suppose there exists bc 2 [c; c] such that qfb (bc) + K 0 (bc) = 0: Then, under
Assumption 1 - 3, in the MFL scheme, the agent is rewarded in two states of nature,
namely es (c) = n if c 2 [c;bc) and es (c) = 1 if c 2 (bc; c] :
In what follows, we maintain the hypothesis that bc does exist, unless di¤erently speci-
ed. Then, the MFL scheme is actually "region-specic", i.e. it is specically characterized
over di¤erent cost ranges, whereas this is not the case in Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4]6.
Proposition 1 Suppose
L 
h
qfb (c) +K 0 (c)
i p (c; es (c))
dp (c; es (c)) =dc; 8c 2 [c; c] ; (9)
with es (c) = n for c < bc and es (c) = 1 for c < bc: Then, under Assumption 1 - 3, the
rst-best outcome is implemented with ex post prots (3) and (4) if
K" (c)  0; 8c 2 [c; c] : (10)
The conditions reported in Proposition 1 are explained as follows. Condition (9) follows
from the circumstance that the agent cannot bear unbounded losses. The solution to ( )
that is picked by the MFL scheme does not implement FB unless (9) is satised. This
condition is similar to that in Proposition 2 of Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4], although it
species di¤erently according to whether c < bc or c > bc: Condition (10) su¢ ces for the
MFL payo¤ prole to be globally incentive compatible in ( ) : It requires that the xed
cost function be (weakly) convex in c:
Let us illustrate the intuition behind (10). The transfer an agent of type c receives
when he reports r and es (c) is observed is given by
t (r; s) = rqfb (r) +K (r) +  (r; s) :
6The particular choice of n and 1 as the signals that trigger a reward is without loss of generality in
the model. The properties of the likelihood function in Assumption 2 and 3, which ensure that n and 1
are the optimal reward signals indeed, could refer to any other pair of cost values.
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This transfer is composed of two elements. The rst element, namely rqfb (r) +K (r) ; is
a xed payment equal to the total cost the agent would bear if he were of type r. The
second element, namely  (r; s) ; is an uncertain payment whose value depends on the
signal realization. Because this realization is unknown to the agent, he faces a lottery
with expected value
nX
s=1
 (r; s) p (c; s) =  
h
fb (r; es (c))  fb (r; es (c))i [p (r; es (r))  p (c; es (r))]
=   q
fb (r) +K (r)
dp (r; es (r)) =dr [p (r; es (r))  p (c; es (r))] :
The introduction of this lottery is meant to o¤set the benet the agent might obtain
with a convenient report as a di¤erence between the xed payment and his true cost.
For this to occur, the lottery should yield su¢ ciently high expected costs for mimicking
types. This requires that the wedge between the reward and the loss designed for type r;
as expressed by the ratio q
fb(r)+K0(r)
dp(r;es(r))=dr ; be large enough. Indeed, this allows P to exploit
the correlation between types, as represented by the di¤erence [p (r; es (r))  p (c; es (r))] ;
to extract surplus. Recall however that, under the MFL scheme, the wedge fb (r; es (c)) 
fb (r; es (c)) is set at the minimum feasible level for each r and, in particular, it equals zero
for r = bc: Thus, whenever bc is reported, the lottery disappears. Under this circumstance,
type c 6= bc is discouraged from reporting bc if and only ifZ bc
c

K 0 (x) K 0 (bc) dx  0; 8c 2 [c; c] ;
which explains (10).
The literature has shown that some restriction on the properties of the cost function
is required for FB implementation also in the absence of countervailing incentives. From
Riordan and Sappington [9], we learn that, when the signal space is smaller than the type
space, together with the conditions on the likelihood function of the relevant signal (the
counterpart of (5) in our model), FB enforcement calls for restrictions on the shape of the
agents cost function. It is thus not surprising that a lower bound on the concavity of K
appears also in our setting. However, the restriction imposed by (10) on the xed cost
function is tighter than the condition identied by Riordan and Sappington [9]. The latter
only requires that the agents cost function be less concave in type than the conditional
likelihood function at the relevant signal. As stated in the corollary below, a similar result
would entail in our model if the agent were to display a systematic incentive either to
overstate or to understate type, whatever the cost realization.
Corollary 1 If there exists no bc 2 [c; c] such that qfb (bc) + K 0 (bc) = 0; then, 8c 2 [c; c] ;
(10) is replaced by
K" (c) 
h
qfb (c) +K 0 (c)
i d2p (c; es (c)) =dc2
dp (c; es (c)) =dc ; (11)
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with es (c) = n when qfb (c) +K 0 (c) > 0 and es (c) = 1 when qfb (c) +K 0 (c) < 0.
The corollary above emphasizes that the presence of countervailing incentives exacer-
bates the requirement on the properties of the cost function.
It should by now be clear that the concavity restriction appears because P adopts the
payo¤ prole that allows her to minimize the decit for each agents type. As already
illustrated, when this scheme is designed for an agent displaying countervailing incentives,
the lottery tends to vanish as r approaches bc: To circumvent this problem, P should
design a di¤erent mechanism under which (1) all agents types do face an e¤ective lottery
whatever the report and (2) (LL) is still satised. We hereafter describe how a scheme
with these characteristics can be constructed.
3.2 The Maximum-sustainable-loss scheme
Suppose (10) holds for all possible types, meaning that limited liability does not (nec-
essarily) compromise FB implementation. As already explained, to induce information
release at no agency cost, the expected value of the lottery is to be low enough.
Lemma 3 The ex post prots that minimize the expected value of the lottery and, at the
same time, satisfy (LIC), (PC) and (LL) are such that, for each type c 2 [c; c] ; the agent
is rewarded for one sole signal s 2 N and incurs the highest admissible loss ( L) for all
the other signals.
The scheme presented in the lemma is similar to the MFL scheme in that it includes
only one reward and equal losses. Yet, losses are here xed at the largest feasible level so
as to minimize the incentive to misreport type for any given c: For this reason, we refer
to it as to the Maximum-sustainable-loss (MSL) scheme. Taken together, Lemma 1 and
3 evidence that spreading losses over as many realizations of s as possible is benecial to
P in two di¤erent ways. First, when the MFL scheme is adopted, spreading losses and
minimizing the reward-loss wedge for the state s in which this wedge is maximum enables
P to minimize the decit that the agent could be required to incur. Second, under the
MSL scheme, spreading losses and maximizing the reward-loss wedge for each possible
realization of s allows P to minimize the expected value of the lottery that the agent is
called to face.
Assumption 3 ensures that the signal s for which the agent is rewarded under the
MSL scheme remains the same as under the MFL scheme, namely es (c) = n if c < bc andes (c) = 1 if c > bc: For any c 2 [c; c] ; the payo¤ prole is given by
fb (c; s)

s=es(c) =
1  p (c; es (c))
p (c; es (c)) L   (c; es (c) ; L) (12)
fb (c; s)

s 6=es(c) =  L   (c; es (c) ; L) ; (13)
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so that the expected value of the lottery is written
nX
s=1
 (r; s) p (c; s) =  L

1  p (c; es (r))
p (r; es (r))

:
This lottery is actually more e¤ective at extracting surplus from the agent, as compared
to the one associated with the MFL scheme, because it allows P to take better advantage
of the correlation between type and signal. As a result, FB is enforced under milder
conditions.
Proposition 2 Suppose condition (9) holds. Then, under Assumption 1 - 3, the rst-best
outcome is implemented with ex post payo¤s (12) and (13) if, 8c 2 [c; c] ;
K" (c) 

qfb (c) +K 0 (c)  dp (c; es (c)) =dc
p (c; es (c)) L

(14)
+
d2p (c; es (c)) =dc2
p (c; es (c)) L;
with es (c) = n for c < bc and es (c) = 1 for c > bc.
This proposition states that, whenever the lowest loss that is compatible with FB
implementation is smaller than the largest decit the agent can sustain, FB is enforced
with payo¤s (12) and (13) provided that K 00 does not fall below the lower bound imposed
by (14). Condition (9) and Assumption 2 ensure that this bound is negative, showing that
the requirement on the curvature of K is now relaxed as compared to (10).
A clear message ensues from our analysis. FB is at hand also when K is concave,
provided that P is available to abandon the MFL scheme and opt for a mechanism that
possibly inicts a more important (though still feasible) penalty to the agent. Gary-
Bobo and Spiegel [4] emphasize that resorting to the MFL scheme, rather than o¤ering
a payo¤ prole that entails a larger decit, can be especially convenient for a principal.
They point out that regulators prefer to avoid nancial di¢ culties for the regulated rms
both to avoid activity interruptions and because this can be embarrassing for themselves.
Our investigation evidences that, when the MFL scheme is adopted in environments with
countervailing incentives, the loss it yields might result excessively low for e¢ ciency to
be achieved. This is actually the case when types are very intensely turned between the
desire to over-report and that to under-report, i.e. when condition (10) is not met.
In the sequel of the analysis, we take (14) to be satised. We thus neglect the possibility
that FB does not attain because xed costs are too concave. We rather focus on the more
interesting case in which FB implementation is beyond reach because the limits on liability
are particularly stringent.
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4 The optimal contract with tight limited liability
In this section, we explore the situation in which (LL) is so tight that condition (9) in
Proposition 1 fails to hold. Under this circumstance, P cannot nd a prole of transfers
(and thus of prots) that implement FB. She thus designs a second-best (SB hereafter)
contract, which is to be characterized in the sequel of the analysis.
To begin with, notice that, in fact, (9) is not violated for all feasible values of c:
Lemma 4 Under Assumption 1 - 3, for any L  0; at the solution to ( ) ; there exists a
unique range of types [c2; c3]  [c; c] ; such that bc 2 [c2; c3] ; for which the rst-best outcome
is implemented.
First of all, limited liability is not an issue as far as type bc is concerned. Indeed, for
this type, (9) is surely satised as qfb (bc) + K 0 (bc) = 0: Furthermore, (9) holds for the
types that lie in a neighborhood of bc; i.e. for all values of c for which the absolute value of
qfb (c) +K 0 (c) is su¢ ciently low. (LL) is more and more likely to be binding as c diverges
from bc:
Lemma 5 Under Assumption 1 - 3, there exists (at most) one cost value c1 2 (c; c2)
(resp. c4 2 (c3; c)) such that, at the solution to ( ) ; (PC) is slack 8c 2 [c; c1) (resp.
8c 2 (c4; c]) and binding 8c 2 [c1; c2] ; (resp. 8c 2 [c3; c4]): When no such a cost value
exists, (PC) is binding 8c 2 [c; c2) (resp. 8c 2 (c3; c]):
At the solution to ( ) under tight limited liability, not only P enforces FB for all
types in [c2; c3] : She is also able to extract all surplus from some types below c2 and
some types above c37. From the proof of Lemma 5 in Appendix, one deduces that the
range of types below c2 (resp. above c3) from which surplus is fully retained spans to the
whole set [c; c2] (resp. [c3; c]) if (i) the rate of increase (resp. decrease) of the conditional
likelihood that signal n (resp. 1) be drawn as c raises, namely dp(c;n)=dcp(c;n) (resp.
dp(c;1)=dc
p(c;1) );
is su¢ ciently large (resp. small) and/or (ii) the xed cost function is not very concave
in type. Intuitively, and in line with the insights from the FB analysis, this means that
P is more likely to induce truthtelling at zero rent when the two signals are especially
informative about type and/or when the agents incentive to cheat is not particularly
intense8. Otherwise, surplus extraction becomes unfeasible for very low and very high
types, whose incentives to misreport are strongest. These types are then assigned a positive
interim payo¤.
The possibility that e¢ cient types obtain an information rent depending on the condi-
tional likelihood of signal n raises a similarity with the ndings of Gary-Bobo and Spiegel
[4]. Indeed, in their model, the agents participation constraint holds strictly for all types
but the least e¢ cient one if the derivative of the conditional likelihood function at n is
7Although surplus is retained, FB is not implemented for these types because quantities are distorted
away from the e¢ cient level, as will become clear shortly.
8The conclusion that convexity of the cost function facilitates Ps task will be further conrmed in
Proposition 3 below.
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small enough9. Observe however that, in our framework, the possibility that (PC) be slack
for all types but one is ruled out due to the fact that the xed cost decreases with type.
This facilitates surplus extraction, indeed, by weakening the incentives to cheat of types
that are su¢ ciently close to bc:
Suppose the conditions described above do hold so that the cost values c1 and c4 exist.
We shall now see how the SB output is characterized in this situation. Consider that the
incentive to overstate (resp. understate) type that an agent with c < bc (resp. c > bc)
would display if he were to receive the sole xed payment to produce the FB quantity gets
increasingly more intense as c approaches c (resp. c): To remove the incentive to mimic by
means of the lottery, while keeping output at the FB level, P would need to progressively
increase the wedge between rewards and losses as c moves away from bc: Nevertheless, (LL)
imposes a bound on how large losses can be set, for FB does not attain when c =2 [c2; c3] :
Without quantity distortions, P could solicit information revelation only by raising the
reward su¢ ciently, which would yield an information rent to the agent. This would be
too costly though. The optimal strategy is thus to reduce the rent by xing output away
from the e¢ cient level. For types with weak incentives to cheat, namely those in [c1; c2)
and (c3; c4] ; P distorts output till all surplus is extracted. This further claries why, over
these cost ranges, participation constraints are saturated, as we said above. For types
with more intense incentives to misreport, namely those in [c; c1] and [c4; c] ; P distorts
output to contain the rent, but it would be too costly to remove the rent entirely.
The whole SB output prole and the thresholds of the relevant cost ranges will be
characterized in a moment. Before proceeding, it is however useful to make the following
standard assumption.
Assumption 4 The conditional likelihood and cumulative distribution function satisfy the
following properties:
d
dc

F (c jn)
f (c jn)

 0; 8c 2 [c; c] (15)
d
dc

1  F (c j1)
f (c j1)

 0; 8c 2 [c; c] : (16)
This assumption states the monotonicity with respect to c of the conditional hazard
rates F (cjn )f(cjn ) and
1 F (cj1 )
f(cj1 ) . According to (15), once types between c and c have been drawn,
it becomes more likely that a type higher than c be drawn, conditional on signal n being
observed. According to (16), once types between c and c have been drawn, it is less likely
that a type higher than c be drawn, conditional on signal 1 being observed.
In the following lemma, roman numbers are appended to denote SB quantities and
payo¤s over the ve relevant cost ranges.
Lemma 6 Suppose condition (9) does not hold. Then, under Assumption 1 - 4, at the
9See page 5 of the technical appendix to Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4].
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solution to ( ); quantities are characterized as follows:
S0
 
qI (c)

= c+ (1  ) F (c jn)
f (c jn) ; 8c 2 [c; c1] (17)
qII (c) =
dp (c; n) =dc
p (c; n)
L K 0 (c) ; 8c 2 [c1; c2] (18)
qIII (c) = qfb (c) ; 8c 2 [c2; c3] (19)
qIV (c) =
dp (c; 1) =dc
p (c; 1)
L K 0 (c) ; 8c 2 [c3; c4] (20)
S0
 
qV (c)

= c  (1  ) 1  F (c j1)
f (c j1) ; 8c 2 [c4; c] : (21)
Moreover, interim prots (rents) are given by
Es

I (c; s)

= p (c; n)
c1Z
c
qI(x)+K0(x)
p(x;n) dx 
h
1  p(c;n)p(c1;n)
i
L;
8c 2 [c; c1]
(22)
Es

k (c; s)

= 0; 8c 2 [c1; c2] ; [c2; c3] ; [c3; c4] ;
8k 2 fII; III; IV g (23)
Es

V (c; s)

=  p (c; 1)
cZ
c4
qV (x)+K0(x)
p(x;1) dx 
h
1  p(c;1)p(c4;1)
i
L;
8c 2 [c4; c] :
(24)
To begin with, (19) conrms that output is still e¢ ciently set as long as c 2 [c2; c3] :
According to (17) and (21), the same occurs at both the lowest and the highest marginal
cost realization. (17) further highlights that output is downward distorted for all types
in (c; c1] ; which allows to contain the rent in (22). Moreover, under the rst part of
Assumption 4, qI decreases with c all over this set. Observe that the SB quantity solution
in Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4] is characterized precisely as in (17) for all possible agents
types. This occurs because, in their context, the agent displays a systematic incentive
to overstate type. (21) further evidences that output is upward distorted for all types in
[c4; c) ; which helps limit the rent in (24). Under the second part of Assumption 4, also
qV decreases with type 8c 2 [c4; c) : Lastly, (18) and (20) dene how output is downward
and upward distorted in the second and fourth region respectively, just enough to fully
extract surplus in an incentive-compatible way.
We now dene the thresholds of the relevant cost ranges, which we have only mentioned
in the lemmas above but not yet characterized.
Lemma 7 Suppose condition (9) does not hold. Then, under Assumption 1 - 4, at the
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Figure 1: The FB output prole (qfb; dotted line) and the output prole in the SB contract with L > 0
(qsbL ; thick line) and L = 0 (q
sb
0 ; dashed line).
solution to ( ); the cost values c1; c2; c3 and c4; are dened as follows:
qI (c1) +K
0 (c1) =
dp (c1; n) =dc1
p (c1; n)
L (25)
qII (c2) = q
fb (c2) (26)
qIV (c3) = q
fb (c3) (27)
qV (c4) +K
0 (c4) =
dp (c4; 1) =dc4
p (c4; 1)
L: (28)
Interpreting Lemma 7 together with the results previously presented, it should be
clear that c1 is the cost value at which P retains all surplus from the agent by su¢ ciently
deating output qI below the FB level, c2 is the value at which P retains all surplus by
keeping output qII at the FB level and similarly for c3 and c4.
A graphical illustration of the full prole of quantities is provided in Figure 1 with
regards to both FB implementation and the SB contract dened by (17) to (21). The
graph evidences that the set of cost values around bc for which FB is still enforced under
tight limited liability enlarges as L raises and would collapse onto the singleton fbcg in the
extreme case in which L = 0: The graph further shows that the SB quantity decreases with
c all over the support, i.e. dq
k(c)
dc  0 8k 2 fI; II; III; IV; V g ; 8c 2 [c; c] ; with a rate of
decrease that is specic to each cost interval10. In particular, it is dq
I(c)
dc <
dqfb(c)
dc <
dqII(c)
dc
and dq
V (c)
dc <
dqfb(c)
dc <
dqIV (c)
dc .
The following proposition lists the conditions under which the SB solution previously
characterized is globally incentive compatible.
Proposition 3 Suppose condition (9) does not hold. Then, under Assumption 1 - 4, the
10That (18) and (20) decrease with c is ensured by condition (31) in Proposition 3 below.
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quantity prole (17) - (21) is implemented as the solution to ( ) if
dqI (c)
dc
   qI (c) +K 0 (c) dp (c; n) =dc
p (c; n)
; 8c 2 [c; c1] (29)
dqV (c)
dc
   qV (c) +K 0 (c) dp (c; 1) =dc
p (c; 1)
; 8c 2 [c4; c] (30)
K" (c)  d
2p (c; es (c)) =dc2
p (c; es (c)) L; 8c 2 [c; c] ; (31)
with es (c) = n for c < bc and es (c) = 1 for c < bc.
We have previously explained that, under Assumption 4, quantities qI and qV decrease
with type. Proposition 3 further evidences that, for the contract presented in Lemma 6
to be globally incentive compatible, it su¢ ces that those quantities decrease su¢ ciently
fast over the respective cost ranges (see Figure 1 again). According to condition (29) and
(30), how fast qI and qV should decrease depends on the rate of change of the conditional
likelihood that is relevant in the concerned region. To illustrate why this is the case, let us
focus on (29), keeping in mind that analogous reasoning applies to (30), mutatis mutandis.
Take c 2 [c; c1) : As the report r is raised above the true type c; under Assumption 2,
the probability of reward increases. Because the loss that the agent might bear equals
 L whatever the report, over-reporting yields a higher interim prot, as compared to
truthtelling, unless the quantity is diminished su¢ ciently. The incentive to over-report is
removed if qI (c) decreases as fast as (29) dictates. Perfectly analogous to (29) would be
the su¢ cient condition for global incentive compatibility in Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4] if,
in their model, the marginal cost were assumed to be constant in type, as it is in ours,
rather than strictly increasing and convex11.
Condition (31) tells that the contract described in Lemma 4 to 6 is optimal if, for all
possible types, the curvature of the xed cost function does not fall below some given bound
that depends on both the conditional likelihood and L: In fact, (31) is the counterpart of
(14) in the FB framework previously explored and can be interpreted in a similar fashion,
mutatis mutandis. Yet, (31) is more stringent as compared to (14). This further reects
the circumstance that, all else equal, it is harder to induce information release when the
limits on the agents liability are tight.
Corollary 2 Take L = 0 and K" (c) = 0; 8c 2 [c; c] : Suppose condition (9) does not
hold, whereas (29) and (30) are satised. Then, at the solution to ( ) ; qsb (c) = qfb (bc) ;
8c 2 [c1; c4] :
The corollary refers to the specic situation in which the agent can bear no decit
ex post and the xed cost is linear in type. In that case, the range of types for which
FB is enforced collapses onto the singleton fbcg : To see this, recall that c2 and c3 are
dened by qII (c2) = qfb (c2) and qII (c3) = qfb (c3) respectively. Moreover, with L = 0;
11Compare the inequality at the end of page 5 in the technical appendix of Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4]
with (65) in the proof of (29) in our Appendix.
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qII (c) =  K 0 (c) and qIV (c) =  K 0 (c). Remembering also the denition of bc, it is
immediate to conclude that c2  bc  c3 when L = 0: Further observe that quantities
qII (c) and qIV (c) are constant over types when so is K 0 (c). Hence, all types within the
set [c1; c4] ; from which surplus is entirely extracted, are required to produce the same
amount of output, i.e. the optimal contract entails pooling at qfb (bc) in a neighborhood
of bc:
The outcome in Corollary 2 is reminiscent of that Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [8]
nd in a setting without correlated information. They characterize the optimal contract
in the presence of countervailing incentives for di¤erent possible shapes of the agents
reservation utility. They show that, when the reservation utility is linear in type, the
contract entails pooling of quantities over some interval of types that earn zero rents12.
The case of K" = 0 in our model is the counterpart for the linear reservation utility in
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [8]. Corollary 2 evidences that, when the case of K" = 0
arises, the optimal contract exhibits analogous features (namely, pooling and no rent in
a neighborhood of bc) in a correlated information framework as soon as the agent cannot
be punished ex post. This is explained by considering that having L = 0 in the presence
of correlated information is tantamount to assuming that the agent has to break even ex
post (rather than at interim), whereas ex post and interim participation are equivalent
without correlated information. Observe however that, despite the analogy in terms of
structure, the optimal contract with correlated information is not simply twice a replica
of the optimal contract without correlated information. Indeed, correlation allows for
improvements, as usual. First, the range of types for which bunching arises is less wide.
Second, the quantity distortions induced for low and high types are smaller. Third, the
expected rents that accrue to those same types are lower than the rents P assigns in the
absence of correlated information.
4.1 "Very concave" xed cost
As previously said, condition (14) in Proposition 2 is taken to be satised all along
the analysis. Even under this assumption, it is not necessarily the case that condition
(31) in Proposition 3 is satised in turn. In what follows, we consider the situation in
which (31) is violated. The following proposition describes the optimal contract under
this circumstance.
Proposition 4 Suppose condition (9) and (31) do not hold. Then, under Assumption 1
- 4, the quantity solution to ( ) is given by
qsb (c) = qI (c) ; 8c 2 c; c 
qsb (c) = qfb (bc) ; 8c 2 c ; c+
qsb (c) = qV (c) ; 8c 2  c+; c ;
12An environment with reservation utility linear in type is analysed also in other works, such as that of
Brainard and Martimort [1], with analogous result.
20
Figure 2: The FB output prole (qfb; dotted line), the output prole in the SB contract with informative
signals (qsb(S); thick line) and the output prole in the SB contract with no informative signal (q
sb
(NS); dashed
line) with K "very" concave.
where c  and c+ are such that
qI
 
c 

= qfb (bc)
qV
 
c+

= qfb (bc) :
Moreover, (PC) is binding only for type bc:
The contract described in the proposition entails pooling of quantities in a neighbor-
hood of bc: This is the sole type from which P is able to retain all surplus when (31) is
violated. The contract is reminiscent of that characterized by Lewis and Sappington [6].
They study countervailing incentives in a setting without correlated signals, focusing on
the case in which the agents xed cost function is concave in type13. Yet, in our environ-
ment, pooling concerns a smaller range of types, a benet that follows from the presence
of information correlation. This is shown by the graph in Figure 2, which compares the
optimal output prole in the two situations.
Having (31) violated means that, as long as L > 0; the xed cost must be su¢ ciently
concave in type for the contract illustrated in Proposition 4 to be SB optimal. By contrast,
in the absence of correlated signals, the optimal contract exhibits the structure aforemen-
tioned even with a slightly concave xed cost. This shows that, whenever some loss can be
inicted to the agent ex post, the presence of information correlation yields an additional
benet. That is, it also enlarges the class of environments in which full separation arises.
Further observe that the structure of the contract in Proposition 4 is similar to that in
Corollary 2, except that, in the former, the range of types with no rent degenerates onto
a singleton. This follows from the circumstance that, as already illustrated, incentives to
over/under-report are especially strong when K is very concave. In that case, information
release is not induced unless a rent is given up even to types around bc: To interpret
this point in a unied way with the rest of our SB results, it is useful to recall that, in
13Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [8] obtain the same outcome in the equivalent situation in which the agents
reservation utility is concave in type.
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the absence of correlated signals, the linear-xed-cost case (or, equivalently, the linear-
reservation-utility case) with pooling and no rent for some type range can be seen as a
"knife-edge" situation: pooling is removed as soon as K becomes convex; all types but
one obtain a rent as soon as K becomes concave (compare Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
[8]). From our analysis, it emerges that the linear case remains a "knife-edge" situation
in correlated information frameworks insofar as ex post decits are unfeasible (recall the
explanation after Corollary 2). In such frameworks, the relevant "knife-edge" situation
becomes condition (31) as soon as the agent can be exposed to (bounded) decits under
interim participation.
5 Concluding remarks
We have studied the optimal contract between a principal and an agent who may
have countervailing incentives to misreport the type, which is correlated with an ex post
publicly observable signal. We have focused on the realistic case in which the agent
is protected by limited liability. As an example of the situations we have represented,
one may consider monopoly regulation in industries (typically, public utilities) in which
overhead costs decline with marginal production costs.
Our analysis predicts that, as long as the agents pocket is su¢ ciently deep, the rst-
best outcome is implemented by the incentive scheme that yields the smallest feasible ex
post loss to the agent (the MFL scheme), if the latters xed cost is either linear or convex
in type. However, the rst-best outcome is unfeasible if the agents technology does not
display this property, unless the principal o¤ers a contract that imposes higher decit to
the agent. We show that, in the presence of countervailing incentives, the contract that
yields the highest sustainable loss (the MSL scheme) expands at maximum the range of
cost functions that support rst best.
Our analysis further predicts that, if the agents xed cost is not very concave in type
(so that incentives to over and under-report are not too intense), the optimal incentive
scheme is a separating contract under which, thanks to the presence of countervailing
incentives, the rst-best outcome can still be e¤ected for some range of types even when
the agent has no especially deep pocket. Otherwise, the optimal contract entails pooling
of quantities. However, the concavity threshold between separating and pooling contracts
does depend on the agents liability. As the latter raises (though not to the point that
rst best can be implemented for any type), increasingly more concave cost functions, i.e.
a wider class of possible technologies, sustain the separating contract.
Our study o¤ers a clue about the achievements that would be at the principals hand
if she were to face multiple agents with correlated information. In that environment, the
signal would be replaced by the type of a second agent. Our results seem to provide further
scope for resorting to centralized incentive schemes in correlated information settings in
which agents display countervailing incentives and can be exposed to some decit ex post.
Our ndings further suggest that, when the characteristics of the technology the agent
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uses make his incentives to lie especially strong, improving contractual e¢ ciency may
require to impose on the agent as much uncertainty as feasible, hence to raise his loss.
This contrasts with the usual attitude of regulators not to aggravate the regulated rms
nancial burden.
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A First-best implementation
A.1 Local incentive constraint (LIC)
Let e (r; s) = t (r; s)  cq (r) K (c) the ex post prot of the agent when he has type
c and reports r while the state of nature is s. His interim prot is written
Es [e (r; s)]  nX
s=1
ft (r; s)  cq (r) K (c)g p (c; s) : (32)
From (32) ; the rst order-condition of the programme of the agent, evaluated at r = c; is
given by
nX
s=1

dt (c; s)
dc
  cq0 (c)

p (c; s) = 0: (33)
From (2a) we can compute
dt (c; s)
dc
=
d (c; s)
dc
+ cq0 (c) + q (c) +K 0 (c) : (34)
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Replacing (34) into (33), we have
nX
s=1

d (c; s)
dc
+

q (c) +K 0 (c)

p (c; s) = 0: (35)
At FB  (c; s) = fb (c; s) and (PC) is binding for all c, so that
nX
s=1
fb (c; s) p (c; s) = 0 (36)
and
nX
s=1
dfb (c; s)
dc
p (c; s) =  
nX
s=1
fb (c; s)
dp (c; s)
dc
:
Using this in (35) together with q (c) = qfb (c) ; (LIC) is obtained.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose es (c) = s; 8c 2 [c; c] ; with s some constant in N: Take also dp(c;s)dc > 0:
For c < bc; the punishment is as from (4) ; i.e. fb (c; s) < 0. Similarly, for c > bc; the
punishment is as from (3) ; i.e. fb (c; s) < 0: Furthermore, because these prots belong to
the MFL scheme, s must maximize both fb (c; s) for c < bc and fb (c; s) for c > bc at once.
The former requires that ddc

p(c;s)
p(c;s)

< 0; 8s 6= s; the latter that ddc

1 p(c;s)
p(c;s)

> 0; 8s 6= s:
Suppose ddc

p(c;s)
p(c;s)

< 0: Together with dp(c;s)dc > 0; this involves that
d
dc

1 p(c;s)
p(c;s)

 0;
contradicting the hypothesis that the MFL scheme is obtained with es (c) = s. The proof
proceeds similarly for dp(c;s)dc < 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The prots (3) and (4) that solve ( 0) also solve ( ) if and only if they satisfy (GIC)
and (LL). In what follows, we nd a su¢ cient condition for them to satisfy (GIC) and
then we prove Proposition 1.
A.3.1 Global incentive compatibility
The interim prot Es [e (r; s)] given by (32) is rewritten
Es [e (r; s)]  qfb (r) (r   c) +K (r) K (c) + nX
s=1
 (r; s) p (c; s) (37)
= qfb (r) (r   c) +K (r) K (c) +
nX
s=1
fb (c; es (r)) p (c; s)
+
h
fb (r; es (c))  fb (r; es (c))i p (c; es (r))
Substituting (3) and (4) ; we rewrite (37) as
Es [e (r; s)] = Z r
c
h
qfb (r) +K 0 (r)
i 
1  dp (x; es (r)) =dx
dp (r; es (r)) =dr

(38)
+K 0(x) K 0(r)	 dx:
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From (38) ; from the condition for global incentive compatibility Es [e (r; s)]  0 and
taking into account that es (r) = n if r < bc and es (r) = 1 if r > bc; we deduce the following
conditions:
K 0(r) K 0(c) 
h
qfb (r) +K 0 (r)
i 
1  dp (c; es (r)) =dc
dp (r; es (r)) =dr

if r  c (39)
K 0(r) K 0(c) 
h
qfb (r) +K 0 (r)
i 
1  dp (c; es (r)) =dc
dp (r; es (r)) =dr

if r  c: (40)
These conditions are satised if K" (c)  0.
A.3.2 Proposition 1
From (3) and (4), from es (r) = n if r  bc and es (r) = 1 if r > bc and from Assumption
1 to 3, we deduce that fb (c; es (r)) < 0 < fb (c; es (c)) 8r 2 [c; c] : Moreover, replacing (3)
and (4) into (LL), we nd that (LL) is satised by condition (9) for any feasible report.
As (3) and (4) satisfy both (LIC) and (GIC) whenever K" (c)  0 (see the proof above),
FB is implemented as the solution to ( ) :
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
It follows immediately from (39) and (40) ; with qfb (r) +K 0 (r) 6= 0 8r 2 [c; c] :
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
We hereafter show that the expected value of the lottery, i.e.
Pn
s=1  (r; s) p (c; s) ; is
minimized (with (LIC), (PC) and (LL) all satised) when P assigns one reward and losses
that are all equal to  L: We proceed as follows. We rst calculate the expected value of
the lottery with one reward and losses all equal to  L: We then calculate the expected
value of the lottery with three distinct prots, the smallest of which equal to  L. We
nally compare the expected value of the lottery in the two cases and show that it is higher
in the latter case.
As a rst step, assume that, when the agent has type c and reports r; he receives
 (r; es (r)) > 0 if the state is some s = es (r) and  (r; es (r)) =  L in any state s 6= es (r). P
seeks to minimize
nX
s=1
 (r; s) p (c; s) =  (r; es (r)) + [ (r; es (r))   (r; es (r))] p (c; es (r)) : (41)
With (PC) binding for type r; we have
 (r; es (r)) =  1  p (r; es (r))
p (r; es (r))  (r; es (r)) :
Replacing this expression into (41) together with  (r; es (r)) =  L; we get
nX
s=1
 (r; s) p (c; s) =  L

1  p (c; es (r))
p (r; es (r))

: (42)
Assume next that P implements FB with three distinct prot levels, namely  (c; es (c)) ;b (c; bs (c)) and  (c; es (c)) ; such that  (c; es (c)) =  L;  (c; es (c)) < b (c; bs (c)) <  (c; es (c))
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and bs (c) 2 N n fes (c)g. The expected value of the lottery becomes
nX
s=1
 (r; s) p (c; s) = [ (r; es (r))   (r; es (r))] p (c; es (r)) (43)
+ (r; es (r)) + [b (c; bs (c))   (r; es (r))] p (c; bs (r)) ;
whereas the binding (PC) is now written
 (r; es (r))   (r; es (r)) =   (r; es (r)) + [b (r; bs (r))   (r; es (r))] p (r; bs (r))
p (r; es (r)) :
Replacing this expression into (43) ; together with  (r; es (r)) =  L; we obtain
nX
s=1
 (r; s) p (c; s) =  L

1  p (c; es (r))
p (r; es (r))

(44)
+ [b (r; bs (r)) + L] 1  p (r; bs (r)) p (c; es (r))
p (c; bs (r)) p (r; es (r))

p (c; bs (r)) :
Calculating the di¤erence between (42) and (44), we further obtain
[b (r; bs (r)) + L]  p (r; bs (r)) p (c; es (r))
p (c; bs (r)) p (r; es (r)) + 1

p (c; bs (r)) :
From Proposition 2, es (r) = n if r < bc and es (r) = 1 if r > bc: Under Assumption 3
and because b (r; bs (r)) + L > 0; the above di¤erence is positive. Hence, the expected
value of the lottery is higher with any triplet f (c; es (c)) ; b (c; bs (c)) ;  (c; es (c))g ; such
that  (c; es (c)) =  L and  (c; es (c)) < b (c; bs (c)) <  (c; es (c)) ; than it is with the pair of
prots f (c; es (c)) ;  (c; es (c))g :
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
As  (c; es (c) ; L) =  L and (PC) is binding, the reward is given by (12). Then, the
payo¤ Es [e (r; s)] described by (38) is rewritten
Es [e (r; s)] = qfb (r) (r   c) +K (r) K (c) + nX
s=1
 (r; es (r) ; L) p (c; s)
+ [ (r; es (r) ; L)   (r; es (r) ; L)] p (c; es (r))
=
Z r
c

qfb (r) +K 0 (r)  Ldp (x; es (r)) =dx
p (r; es (r)) +K 0(x) K 0(r)

dx:
Under (14) ; Es [e (r; s)]  0 for all x < r: To see which value the state es (r) takes, suppose
c < r. Under Assumption 3, the ratio p(c;es(r))p(r;es(r)) in the expression here above is minimized.
Hence, (14) is least stringent if s (r) = n when r < bc and s (r) = 1 when r > bc. The same
reasoning applies for r > c.
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B The optimal contract with tight limited liability
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4
From the denition of bc in Lemma 2, (9) holds for c = bc; 8L  0: Take now c < bc and
suppose that (9) is violated for c; in which case
qfb (c) +K 0 (c) > L
dp (c; n) =dc
p (c; n)
: (45)
(i) Suppose that
dqfb (c)
dc
+K" (c) <
L
p (c; n)
"
d2p (c; n)
dc2
  (dp (c; n) =dc)
2
p (c; n)
#
: (46)
and recall that dq
fb(c)
dc + K
" (c) < 0 (Assumption 1). It follows that, as c raises, the left
hand side (LHS hereafter) of (45) decreases faster than the right hand side (RHS hereafter).
Because (45) does not hold for c = bc; there is at most one value c2 2 [c;bc] such that (45)
does not hold for any c 2 [c; c2) and holds for all c 2 [c2;bc] : This value exists if (45) holds
for c = c.
(ii) Next suppose that (46) is not satised, so that, as c raises, the LHS of (45) decreases
less fast than the RHS. Hence, if (45) does not hold for c = c; then it does not hold for
any c 2 [c;bc] ; in which case there is no c in this interval for which (9) is violated. If (45)
holds for c = c; then it must hold for any c 2 [c;bc] ; involving that (9) is violated for all
types within this interval. This contradicts the denition of bc; under which (9) is satised
for c = bc. Therefore, (45) does not hold for c = c; so that (9) is satised for all c 2 [c;bc].
Considering (i) and (ii) altogether, we deduce that there exists at most one subset
[c; c2)  [c;bc] over which (9) is violated, with c2 2 [c;bc] : This value exists if and only if
(9) is violated for c = c:
A similar reasoning applies when c > bc; meaning that there exists at most one subset
(c3; c]  [bc; c] ; with c3 2 [bc; c] ; for which (9) is violated.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Take c 2 [c; c2). By Lemma 4, (LL) is binding. By Lemma 3, the optimal contract is
such that there is only one reward and equal losses xed at  L: Furthermore, the proof of
Lemma 6 shows that, for any c 2 [c;bc] to which a rent accrues with this prole of prots,
the SB quantity is given by qI (c) as dened by (17) in the main text, while in case no
rent accrues the SB quantity is given by qII (c) as dened by (18). A rent is left to type
c 2 [c;bc] if and only if
qI (c) +K 0 (c) > L
dp (c; n) =dc
p (c; n)
: (47)
Indeed, for the types for which (47) is violated, P is better o¤ by choosing the quantity
qII (c)  qI (c) such that all surplus is extracted.
From Assumption 1 and because dq
I(c)
dc <
dqfb(c)
dc ; it is K
" (c) <  dqI(c)dc : Using this
condition, we proceed identically as in the proof of Lemma 4 but replacing qfb (c) with
qI (c) ; c2 with c1; bc with c2 and (45) with (47). We nd that the curves qI (c) + K 0 (c)
and Ldp(c;n)=dcp(c;n) cross once at most, at some c1 2 [c; c2). This value c1 exists if and only if
(47) is satised for c = c (and a rent is given up at least to type c):
The procedure is similar for c 2 [bc; c].
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B.3 Proof of Lemma 6
B.3.1 Expected utility
Dene fW (a; b)  Z b
a
nX
s=1
[V (q (c)) +  (c; s)] p (c; s) f (c) dc; (48)
so that the objective function in ( ) is rewritten
fW = hfW (c; c1) +fW (c1; c2) +fW (c2; c3) +fW (c3; c4) +fW (c4; c)i :
As the maximization of the expected utility in each cost interval is independent of that in
any other interval, we treat the various intervals separately. We have already established
that, in the situation under scrutiny, FB attains 8c 2 [c2; c3] (Lemma 4) and we shall not
come back to this case.
B.3.2 The solution for c 2 [c; c1)
This proof is close to that of Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [4]. We rst calculate the ex post
transfer, then the expected transfer for c 2 [c; c1), namely E (t1). We nally replace it
into the expression of fW (c; c1) and optimize with respect to quantity.
The ex post transfer when c 2 [c; c1) It is useful to dene t (c; s)  g (c) the transfer
the agent receives when s = es (c) and t (c; s)  h (c; s) the transfer he receives when
s 6= es (c). For sake of simplicity, h (c; s) is dened for any s 2 N; although in reality
h (c; es (c)) does not exist (as the agent is not punished in state es (c)). Replacing into (33)
and rearranging, we get
g0 (c) =
nX
s=1
cq0 (c)
p (c; s)
p (c; es (c))  
nX
s=1
dh (c; s)
dc
p (c; s)
p (c; es (c)) + dh (c; es (c))dc
Dene ck 2 fc1; c4g any type c for which Es [ (ck; s)] = 0. Integrating all terms above
from c to ck we obtain
g (c) = g (ck) 
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
xq0 (x)
p (x; s)
p (x; es (c))dx (49)
+
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
dh (x; s)
dx
p (x; s)
p (x; es (c))dx  h (ck; es (c)) + h (c; es (c)) :
Integrating by parts the second and the third term in the RHS of (49) ; we rewrite it as
g (c) = g (ck)  h (ck; es (c)) + h (c; es (c)) (50)
 
nX
s=1
ckq (ck)
p (ck; s)
p (ck; es (c)) +
nX
s=1
h (ck; s)
p (ck; s)
p (ck; es (c))
+
nX
s=1
cq (c)
p (c; s)
p (c; es (c))  
nX
s=1
h (c; s)
p (c; s)
p (c; es (c))
+
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
q (x)
d
dx

x
p (c; s)
p (x; es (c))

dx 
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
h (x; s)
d
dx

p (x; s)
p (x; es (c))

dx:
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Denote
 s (c) 
p (c; s)
p (c; es (c)) : (51)
Using it in (50) we obtain
g (c) =
nX
s=1
[h (ck; s)  ckq (ck)] s (ck) + g (ck) (52)
 h (ck; es (c)) + nX
s=1
q (c) c s (c) +
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
q (x)
d
dx
[x s (x)] dx
 
nX
s=1
h (c; s) s (c) 
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
h (x; s) 0s (x) dx+ h (c; es (c)) :
Using (2a) we can group the expression
nX
s=1
[h (ck; s)  ckq (ck)] s (ck) + r (ck)  h (ck; es (ck))
=
nX
s=1
[ (ck; s) +K (ck)] s (ck) :
Replacing into (52) returns
g (c) =
nX
s=1
[ (ck; s) +K (ck)] s (ck) 
nX
s=1
h (c; s) s (c) +
nX
s=1
cq (c) s (c) (53)
+h (c; es (c)) + Z ck
c
nX
s=1
q (x)
d
dx
[x s (x)] dx 
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
h (x; s) 0s (x) dx:
Using (2a) as well as t (c; s) = h (c; s) for s 6= es (c) and letting sb (c; s) the loss, we have
sb (c; s) = h (c; s)  [cq (c) +K (c)] : We use this to rewrite the expressionZ ck
c
nX
s=1
q (x)
d
dx
[x s (x)] dx 
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
h (x; s) 0s (x) dx
=
Z ck
c
nX
s=1

q (x) s (x) + [xq (x)  h (x; s)] 0s (x)

dx
=
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
h
q (x) s (x) 
h
sb (x; s) +K (x)
i
 0s (x)
i
dx:
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Replacing this into (53) yields the ex post transfer
g (c) =
nX
s=1
[ (ck; s) +K (ck)] s (ck) +
nX
s=1
cq (c) s (c)
 
"
nX
s=1
h (c; s) s (c)  h (c; es (c))
#
(54)
+
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
q (x) s (x) 
h
sb (x; s) +K (x)
i
 0s (x) dx:
The expected transfer for c 2 [c; c1) Using the notation h (c; s) and g (c) as dened
above, the expected transfer E (t1) when c < c1 is given by
E (t1) =
Z c1
c
"
n 1X
s=1
h (c; s) p (c; s) + g (c) p (c; n)
#
f (c) dc
Substitute es (c) = n and ck = c1 into (54) and then substitute g (c) from (54) into the
above expression. This yields
E (t1) =
Z c1
c
(
nX
s=1
([ (c1; s) +K (c1)] s (c1) + cq (c) s (c))
+
nX
s=1

q (c) s (c) 
h
sb (c; s) +K (c)
i
 0s (c)
)
p (c; n) f (c) dc
Dene
 (c) 
Z c
c
p (x; n) f (x) dx; 8c 2 [c; c1) (55)
for any c 2 [c; c1). We calculateZ c1
c
(Z c1
c
"
nX
s=1

q (x) s (x) 
h
sb (x; s) +K (x)
i
 0s (x)
#
dx
)
p (c; n) f (c) dc
=
Z c1
c
(
nX
s=1

q (c) s (c) 
h
sb (c; s) +K (c)
i
 0s (c)
)
 (c) dc
We thus nd
E (t1) =
Z c1
c
(
nX
s=1
([ (c1; s) +K (c1)] s (c1) + cq (c) s (c))
)
p (c; n) f (c) dc
+
Z c1
c
(
nX
s=1

q (c) s (c) 
h
sb (c; s) +K (c)
i
 0s (c)
)
 (c) dc: (56)
30
The optimal output for c 2 [c; c1) Substituting (56) into (2a) and then (2a) into the
expression of fW (c; c1) from (48), we rewrite it as follows:
fW (c; c1) = Z c1
c
nX
s=1
[S (q (c))  cq (c)  K (c)] p (c; s) f (c) dc (57)
  (1  )
Z c1
c
(
nX
s=1
([ (c1; s) +K (c1)] s (c1)
+cq (c) s (c))g p (c; n) f (c) dc (58)
  (1  )
Z c1
c
(
nX
s=1

q (c) s (c) 
h
sb (c; s) +K (c)
i
 0s (c)
)
 (c) dc
From the denition of c1 (see Lemma 5), Es [ (c1; s)] = 0: Also, becausefW (c; c1) decreases
with sb (c; s), it is optimal to set the latter at the lowest feasible value, i.e. sb (c; s) =  L.
Replacing into fW (c; c1), the rst-order condition with respect to q, 8c 2 [c; c1), is given
by 
S0 (q (c))  c p (c; s) f (c)
= (1  ) [c s (c) p (c; n) f (c) +  s (c) (c)] :
Denoting qI (c) the quantity that satises the condition above together with (51) and (55) ;
we can rewrite
S0
 
qI (c)

= c+ (1  )  s (c)
p (c; s) f (c)
[cp (c; n) f (c) +  (c)]
= c+ (1  )
R c
c p (x; s) f (x) dx
p (c; n) f (c)
= c+ (1  ) F (c jn)
f (c jn) ;
with F (c jn) =
R c
c p(x;n)f(x)dxR c
c p(x;n)f(x)dx
and f (c jn) = p(c;n)f(c)R c
c p(x;n)f(x)dx
.
B.3.3 The solution for c 2 [c1; c2)
From Lemma 5 one has Es [ (c; s)] = 0 whenever c 2 [c1; c2). It means that the
functional form of the ex post prot  (c; s) is similar to that in (3) and (4) ; except that
qfb (c) is replaced by qII (c) ; the value of which we need to determine. In particular, the
punishment is given by
sb (c; s) =   qII (c) +K 0 (c) p (c; n)
dp (c; n) =dc
:
Moreover, by Lemma 4 (see also proof of Lemma 6), sb (c; s) =  L;8c 2 [c; c2). Using
this in the expression above, qII (c) is found to be as dened in (18) :
The proof is identical for c 2 (c3; c4].
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B.3.4 The solution for c 2 (c4; c]
Dene
' (c) 
Z c
c
p (x; 1) f (x) dx;8c 2 (c4; c] :
Proceeding as for c 2 [c; c1) ; one nds the expected transfer E (t2) that corresponds to
c 2 (c4; c] as follows
E (t2) =
Z c
c4
(
nX
s=1
([ (c4; s) +K (c4)] s (c4) + cq (c) s (c))
)
p (c; 1) f (c) dc
+
Z c
c4
(
nX
s=1
h
sb (c; s) +K (c)
i
 0s (c)  q (c) s (c)
)
' (c) dc (59)
Substituting (59) into fW (c4; c) ; we can characterize the optimal output qV (c) as
S0
 
qV (c)

= c  (1  ) 1  F (c j1)
f (c j1) ;
with [1  F (c j1)] =
R c
c p(x;1)f(x)dxR c
c p(x;1)f(x)dx
and f (c j1) = p(c;1)f(c)R c
c p(x;1)f(x)dx
.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The interim prot of the agent when he reports r is written similarly to (37) as
Es [e (r; s)] = qsb (r) (r   c) +K (r) K (c) + nX
s=1
 (r; s) p (c; s) ; (60)
with qsb 2 qI ; qII ; qIII ; qIV ; qV 	 (see Lemma 6). The ex post prot  (r; s) that appears
in (60) is calculated in a di¤erent way according to the value the report r takes. We thus
develop the analysis case by case.
B.4.1 Case r 2 [c; c1]
We proceed as follows. We rst calculate the ex post prot  (r; s) ; 8r 2 [c; c1].
We replace into (60) so as to calculate Es [e (r; s)] : We nally state the global incentive
condition Es [e (r; s)]  Es [ (c; s)] for any report r 2 [c; c1] : Two sub-cases are considered,
namely c 2 [c; c1] and c 2 [c1; c] :
The ex post prot  (r; s) Recall that ck 2 fc1; c4g is by denition a type c for which
Es ( (ck; s)) = 0. Using the denition of ck and replacing
Pn
s=1  s (ck) =
1
p(ck;es(ck)) (from
(51)) into (54) ; we obtain
g (c) =
K (ck)
p (ck; es (ck)) + cqsb (c)
nX
s=1
 s (c) 
nX
s=1
h (c; s) s (c) + h (c; es (c))
+
Z ck
c
(
nX
s=1
h
qsb (x) s (x) 
h
sb (x; s) +K (x)
i
 0s (x)
i)
dx:
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We further calculate
nX
s=1
cqsb (c) s (c) 
nX
s=1
h (c; s) s (c) + h (c; es (c))
=
nX
s=1
h
cqsb (c)  h (c; s)
i
 s (c) + h (c; es (c))
=
nX
s=1
h
 K (c)  sb (c; s)
i
 s (c) + 
sb (c; es (c)) + cqsb (c) +K (c)
=
nX
s=1
( K (c) + L) s (c)  L+ cqsb (c) +K (c)
= [L K (c)] 1  p (c; es (c))
p (c; es (c)) + cqsb (c)
and then substitute into the expression of g (c) above. Rearranging yields
g (c) = cqsb (c) +
Z ck
c
qsb (x)
 
nX
s=1
 s (x)
!
dx+
1  p (c; es (c))
p (c; es (c)) [L K (c)]
+L
Z ck
c
 
nX
s=1
 0s (x)
!
dx 
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
 
K (x) 0s (x)

dx+
K (ck)
p (ck; es (c)) :
Integrating by parts
R ck
c
 Pn
s=1  
0
s (x)

dx; where  s (x) is dened by (51) ; together withR ck
c
Pn
s=1
 
K (x) 0s (x)

dx and then replacing into the above expression of g (c) ; we nd
g (c) = cqsb (c) +K (c) +
1  p (ck; es (c))
p (ck; es (c)) L (61)
+
Z ck
c
nX
s=1
h
qsb (x) +K 0 (x)
i
 s (x) dx:
Using (61) in (2a) for t (r; es (r)) = g (r) (knowing that g (r) is the transfer that corresponds
to type es (r)), the reward of the agent when he reports r 2 [c; c1] and es (r) = n is written
 (r; n) =
Z c1
r
qI (x) +K 0 (x)
p (x; n)
dx+
1  p (c1; n)
p (c1; n)
L: (62)
From the proof of Lemma 6,  (r; s) =  L whenever r 2 [c; c1] and s 6= n.
The interim prot Using (62) and  (r; s) =  L for s 6= n in (60) ; Es [e (r; s)] is
rewritten
Es [e (r; s)] =  Z c
r

qI (r) +K 0 (x)

dx+ p (c; n)
Z c1
r
qI (x) +K 0 (x)
p (x; n)
dx
 

1  p (c; n)
p (c1; n)

L; (63)
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whereas the interim prot from a truthful report r = c is given by
Es [ (c; s)] = p (c; n)
Z c1
c
qI (x) +K 0 (x)
p (x; n)
dx 

1  p (c; n)
p (c1; n)

L: (64)
Sub-case c 2 [c; c1] Using (63) and (64) ; we have Es [ (c; s)]  Es [e (r; s)] if and only
if Z r
c

qI (x) +K 0 (x)
 
1  p (c; n)
p (x; n)

dx+
Z r
c

qI (r)  qI (x) dx  0: (65)
This condition is satised whenever so is (29) in Proposition 3.
Sub-case c 2 [c1; c] Assume that r = c1 and calculate from (63) the following
dEs [e (c; s)]
dc
=   qI (c1) +K 0 (c)+ L
p (c1; n)
dp (c; n)
dc
=   qI (c1) +K 0 (c1)+ L
p (c1; n)
dp (c1; n)
dc1
+K 0 (c1) K 0 (c) + L
p (c1; n)

dp (c; n)
dc
  dp (c1; n)
dc1

= K 0 (c1) K 0 (c) + L
p (c1; n)

dp (c; n)
dc
  dp (c1; n)
dc1

:
With (31) from Proposition 3 satised for es (c) = n, dEs[e(c1;s)]dc  0. Moreover, if c = c1;
then Es [e (c1; s)] = Es [ (c1; s)], which is zero by Lemma 5. Therefore, under (31),
Es [e (c1; s)]  0 whenever c 2 [c1; c] and r = c1.
Take now r  c1 and calculate
dEs [e (r; s)]
dr
=  
Z c
r

qI (r) +K 0 (r)
 dp (x; n) =dx
p (r; n)
+
dqI (r)
dr

dx:
We look for the condition under which dEs[e(r;s)]dr  0: Because c  c1 and r  c1, this
inequality holds if and only if
dqI (r)
dr
   qI (r) +K 0 (r) dp (x; n) =dx
p (r; n)
; 8r 2 [c; c1] and x  c1; (66)
which is implied by (29) together with Assumption 2 and x  ri: As dEs[e(r;s)]dr  08r 2 [c; c1] and c 2 [c1; c] ; whereas Es [e (c1; s)]  0 (as previously found), one has
Es [e (r; s)]  0, 8r 2 [c; c1] and c 2 [c1; c].
Overall, (29) and (31) ensure that the agent has no incentive to report r 2 [c; c1] such
that r 6= c, whatever his real type.
B.4.2 Case r 2 [c1; c2]
As  (r; s) =  L for s 6= n and Es [ (r; s)] = 0 8r 2 [c1; c2] (by Lemma 4), we have
 (r; n) = 1 p(r;n)p(r;n) L. Substituting these values of  (r; s) into Es [e (r; s)], together with
qII (r) = dp(r;n)=drp(r;n) L K 0 (r) (from Lemma 6), we nd that, with regards to this interval,
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(60) species as
Es
heIIi = Z r
c

L
p (r; n)

dp (r; n)
dr
  dp (x; n)
dx

+K 0 (x) K 0 (r)

dx:
From the expression above, condition (31) and es (c) = n, we can establish that Es heIIi 
0:
B.4.3 Case r 2 [c2; c3]
Proposition 2 shows that, in this case, the condition for global incentive compatibility
is given by (14), which is implied by (31).
B.4.4 Case r 2 [c3; c4]
Proceeding as we did for r 2 [c1; c2] ; we nd that the payo¤ of the agent when he
reports r is written
E
heIV i = Z r
c

L
dp (r; 1) =dr
p (r; 1)
 K 0 (r) +K 0 (x)  L
p (r; 1)
dp (x; 1)
dx

dx
=
Z r
c

L
p (r; 1)

dp (r; 1)
dr
  dp (x; 1)
dx

+K 0 (x) K 0 (r)

dx:
Together with es (c) = 1, (31) in Proposition 3 involves that E heIV i  0:
B.4.5 Case r 2 [c4; c]
We follow the same steps as with the very rst case.
The ex post prot  (r; s) Using (61) in (2a) for t (r; es (r)) = g (r), the reward of the
agent when he reports r 2 [c4; c] and es (r) = 1 is written
 (r; 1) =  
Z r
c4
qV (x) +K 0 (x)
p (x; 1)
dx+
1  p (c4; 1)
p (c4; 1)
L; (67)
From the proof of Lemma 6,  (r; s) =  L whenever r 2 [c; c4] and s 6= 1.
The interim prot The interim prot of the agent when he reports r is given by
E
heV i = Z r
c

qV (r) +K 0 (x)

dx 
Z r
c4

qV (x) +K 0 (x)
 p (c; 1)
p (x; 1)
dx
 L

1  p (c; 1)
p (c4; 1)

; (68)
whereas the interim prot in case of truthtelling is written
Es [ (c; s)] =  
Z c
c4

qV (x) +K 0 (x)
 p (c; 1)
p (x; 1)
dx  L

1  p (c; 1)
p (c4; 1)

: (69)
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Sub-case c 2 [c4; c] Using (68) and (69) ; we have Es [ (c; s)]  Es [e (r; s)] if and only
if Z r
c

qV (x) +K 0 (x)
 
1  p (c; 1)
p (x; 1)

dx+
Z r
c

qV (ri)  qV (x)

dx  0:
This condition is satised whenever so is (30) in Proposition 3.
Sub-case c =2 [c4; c] Take rst r = c4 and calculate
dE
heV i
dc
=   qV (c4) +K 0 (c)+ dp (c; 1) =dc
p (c4; 1)
L
=   qV (c4) +K 0 (c4)+ dp (c4; 1) =dc4
p (c4; 1)
L
+K 0 (c4) K 0 (c) + dp (c; 1) =dc  dp (c4; 1) =dc4
p (c4; 1)
L
= K 0 (c4) K 0 (c) + dp (c; 1) =dc  dp (c4; 1) =dc4
p (c4; 1)
L:
One has
dE[eV ]
dc  0 if (31) in Proposition 3 holds. Moreover, E
heV i = 0 if c = r = c4.
This shows that any type c =2 [c4; c] that reports r = c4 obtains E
heV i  0: Furthermore,
dE
heV i
dr
=

qV (r) +K 0 (r)
 
1  p (c; 1)
p (r; 1)

+
Z r
c
dqV (r)
dr
dx
=
Z r
c

dqV (r)
dr
+

qV (r) +K 0 (r)
 dp (x; 1) =dx
p (r; 1)

dx:
E
heV i  0 for any report r 2 [c4; c] if dE[eV ]dr  0; which is implied by
dqV (r)
dr
   qV (r) +K 0 (r) dp (x; 1) =dx
p (r; 1)
:
In turn, this is implied by (30) in Proposition 3 together with Assumption 2 and x  r.
Overall, the agent has no incentive to report r 2 [c4; c] such that r 6= c whenever (30)
and (31) are satised.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We proceed as follows. We begin by showing that, whenever (31) is violated for any
feasible c, at the SB solution, there exists no c 6= bc for which (PC) is binding. We then
rewrite ( ) for the situation in which (PC) is not binding 8c 6= bc and show that there
exists a unique cost range over which pooling arises.
Suppose (PC) is binding over some non empty interval

cL; cH

; with either cL 6= bc or
cH 6= bc or both. Assume also that FB is not implementable over this interval at the solution
to ( ) : From the proof of Lemma 6, the SB quantity would be qII (c) ; 8c 2 cL; cH :
Furthermore, the proof of Proposition 3 shows that the quantity qII (c) and the transfers
that leave no rent to the agent are not implementable when (31) is not satised for any
feasible c. This contradicts the assumption that (PC) is binding and, at the same time,
FB is not at hand for types in

cL; cH

.
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Now suppose that, at the solution to ( ) ; (PC) is binding and FB is implemented
8c 2 cL; cH. From Lemma 5, it follows that there exist other cost values around cL; cH
for which (PC) is binding and the SB quantity is qII (c) : Once again, as (31) is not satised
for any feasible c, this contradicts also the assumption that FB is enforced 8c 2 cL; cH.
Overall, there exists no subset

cL; cH

; with either cL 6= bc or cH 6= bc or both, in which
(PC) is binding. It follows that (PC) is slack for 8c 6= bc: Hence, the interval [c2; c4] dened
by Lemma 4 reduces to the singleton fbcg : From the proof of Proposition 3, the scheme is
globally incentive compatible whenever
dqsb (c)
dc
  
h
qsb (c) +K 0 (c)
i dp (c; es (c)) =dc
p (c; es (c)) ; 8c 2 [c; c] ; c 6= bc; (70)
qsb (c) being the SB quantity for type c. We can thus rewrite ( ) as
max
q(c)
fW  hfW (c;bc) +fW (bc; c)i
s:t: (70) ;
where fW (c;bc) and fW (bc; c) as dened in the proof of Lemma 6 are such that, beside (70),
all other relevant constraints are satised. In particular, fW (c;bc) is dened by (48) with c1
replaced by bc and sb (c; s) =  L. For low and high types, the optimal quantities are still
qI (c) and qV (c) respectively, as characterized by (17) and (21) in Lemma 6. However,
such quantities do not satisfy (70) in a neighborhood of bc: To see this, rewrite (70) as
qsb (c)  qsb (bc) + Z bc
c
h
qsb (x) +K 0 (x)
i dp (x; n) =dx
p (x; n)
; 8c 2 [c;bc)
qsb (c)  qsb (bc)  Z cbc
h
qsb (x) +K 0 (x)
i dp (x; 1) =dx
p (x; 1)
; 8c 2 (bc; c] :
In either inequality, the RHS approaches qsb (bc) for c close to bc: Moreover, at the solution
to ( ) ; qsb (bc) = qsb (bc) and qI (c) < qfb (c) < qV (c) 8c 2 [c; c] : Hence, pooling of output
arises around bc. The pooling interval is unique for the same reasons as in Lewis and
Sappington [6] (compare pp.309-310 in their article) and the proof is here omitted. As
the unique pooling interval includes bc and as qsb (bc) = qfb (bc) ; we have qsb (c) = qfb (bc)
8c 2 [c ; c+], where c  is dened by qI(c ) = qfb (bc) and c+ by qV (c+) = qfb (bc).
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